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up a large part of Mr. Pollen's book, it will be seen that every fact has been made to give up its meaning, and that the meanings of all the facts gather into two general ideas of a sort not unfamiliar in appearance but seldom found, on examination, to be supported by reasoning anything like so rigorous and realistic as that which Mr. Pollen employs. When Mr. Pollen says that a Higher Command is necessary both to determine the root principles of strategy and to solve so far as possible in advance the technical problems that naval warfare involves, he is not simply urging, on general principles, what would seem on *a priori* grounds to be a good thing: he is giving us the logic of England's experience.

It is plain that a navy department may blunder. It is plain that a navy department needs as safeguards, first, an organization of expert knowledge such as will enable it to solve its particular problems adequately and consistently, and, second, such an education of public opinion as will subject the administration of the navy to the wholesome effect of intelligent criticism while preserving it from ill-judged interference. In a democratic country, like England or America, in which naval measures must inevitably be influenced to some extent by the popular judgment, there is danger when the people, disappointed with the results of naval policy, simply cry out against certain leaders and so bring to pass changes of a political rather than an administrative nature; and there is danger, at least as great, when the people are led by specious logic into false security. Surely these things are worth knowing and pondering.

THE ESSENTIALS OF AN ENDURING VICTORY. By André Chéradame. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons.

Although it was completed a little before the cessation of hostilities and so fails to take into account the armistice and the facts immediately connected with that event, M. Chéradame's latest book is important and timely. One can never be sure that the depths of German duplicity have been sounded; one can never be warned too often against the old fatal mistake of underrating the enemy. It is because M. Chéradame was one of the first—if not actually the first—of men outside the Central Empires to take the full measure of the Pan-German scheme, that he has been able all along to perceive the hidden motives and to appreciate the resources of the Germans. The map of Europe, as he has studied it, has furnished the key both to economic and psychological problems—in short to the whole problem of power.

M. Chéradame anticipated what David Jayne Hill has called "Germany's pose for peace," and he was quick to see the dangers that might grow out of an armistice.

It is surprising to learn the extent to which during the war Allied public opinion was misled as to real conditions in Germany. From the rumor that the Kaiser was dying of cancer to the seemingly authoritative statement that the German people had at last learned, despite their rulers, the magnitude of the disaster that had befallen their arms, all was deceit subtly designed to encourage a too hopeful feeling among the people in the Allied countries and thus

to cause a relaxation of effort. A majority of those despatches concerning German conditions that filtered through from neutral states are seen to have been inspired. On analysis it is clear that all this inspired news, so widely circulated and so eagerly read, fitted in exactly with German schemes, and that none of it failed to produce a certain effect.

During the war we were many times ready to believe that Germany was reduced to the verge of starvation, and that her man-power was nearly exhausted. Both opinions seem to have been quite wrong; for it was neither want of food nor want of men that finally brought Germany to her knees, but the collapse in the Balkans—a collapse that meant the failure of the whole Mittel-Europa system. So true is this that M. Chéradame is able to show by very precise arguments that “if the decisive importance of the Danube front and of political strategy had been understood in 1915, the war might have been ended long since by a decisive victory.” Even so able a critic as Colonel Repington was wide of the truth in his estimate of the number of German reserves, and the rest of us, when we rejoiced over the presence in the German army of boys of seventeen, were mistaking for a sign of weakness what was really an indication of strength! But the whole argument concerning German reserves alone failed to take into account a factor that became of immense importance after the suppression of the Russian front. After that event Germany could have drawn men from a population of about 163 millions, including German subjects in Russia (to the number of 2,400,000), Finns and Ukrainians, always strongly pro-German, and many different groups of Moslems. Unless, therefore, the German armies were somewhere (preferably in the Balkans) promptly and decisively defeated, the Central Powers might hold out indefinitely so far as man-power was concerned. Similarly, whatever temporary privations (severe enough, no doubt) the German people had to endure, it was certain that in the long run, the resources of Mittel-Europa would prove abundant. The problem, in short, was not only military but also geographical and political to an extent that the people in the Entente nations could scarcely be expected to realize and that their leaders were slow to grasp. “It is only at the end of the fourth year of the struggle,” writes M. Chéradame, “that we are beginning to understand the value of the Czecho-Slovak and Jugo-Slav populations, who with the Poles and Roumanians form a group of nearly sixty millions of anti-Germans inhabiting central Europe. . . . If the Germans were in the Allies’ place, is it possible to believe that they would fail for four years to play the trump-card in their hand, represented by seven millions of anti-German populations?”

Just as Germany, during the war, sought to persuade us that she was starving and that her people were ripe for revolt, so now she will make it appear that she is too poor to pay indemnities, and that she has become republican at heart. The fact is, declares M. Chéradame, that Germany is running over with the plunder of the countries she has despoiled, while France has suffered economic losses not easily to be repaired. Easy peace terms, such as Germany now whines for, might leave Germany the victor and France the loser. “Only annuities paid by the Germans for damages inflicted, used to back French national loans, will enable France to save her people from taxes that would soon be fatal. . . . The French believe firmly that a just peace

will bring restitution, and that is why they have not lost faith in their paper currency, which in spite of its increase retains its full purchasing power." Moreover, past experience should have taught us to distrust not merely the German militarists, but also the German Socialists, many of whom are at bottom Pan-Germanists, and who have the military spirit in the very blood of their race. Into the war the whole German people flung themselves, body and soul; they must bear their responsibility, and, republican or not, they must be both severely dealt with and must continue to be distrusted by the rest of the world.

M. Chéradame's statement of the peace terms that ought to be imposed is clear, definite, and bold. As to territorial rearrangements, the author is in general accord with the ideas expressed by Colonel Roosevelt and by Senator Lodge, but he points out the difficulties, the danger spots, and the opportunities, with a clearness and definiteness possible only to a life-long student of the mid-European situation. As to reparations and indemnities, he voices the just claims of France, which Americans should be the last to question. As to the necessity of completely crushing German militarism M. Chéradame undoubtedly expresses the prevailing American temper of mind. In regard to this, "thorough" is the word! His warnings as to the real nature of German Bolshevism and as to the dangers of a league for peace give answers to questions just now arising in many minds. This book of M. Chéradame's should, therefore, do much to crystalize American sentiment on the points of real importance. The author's eminently practical and concrete way of thinking, coupled with his unmistakable enthusiasm for ideals that are realizable, ought to give his words easy entrance into American minds.

FRANCE FACING GERMANY. Speeches and Articles by Georges Clemenceau. Translated from the French by Ernest Hunter Wright. New York: E. P. Dutton & Company.

In order to understand the spirit of a people, the shortest way, and one of the best ways, is to study the minds of the men who lead that people and the nature of the eloquence that really moves them. And so without undervaluing the many excellent interpretations of French fighting spirit, of French unanimity, and of French loftiness of motive, that have been given to American readers, one may say that no work of more lasting significance as affording insight into the soul of the nation has appeared than the collected speeches and occasional articles of the Premier Georges Clemenceau.

What has impressed foreign observers in France is the *humanity* of the French army and people—a quality that appears to be at the root of their unconquerable resistance. This "humanity"—characteristic of an advanced civilization—seems, in the writings of Clemenceau, to be founded, curiously enough, in a deep disillusionment, which is, however, still more strangely (as it would seem to Americans) coupled with a devoted idealism.

Try to conceive of an American statesman addressing the people, or any considerable body of the people, in words like these:

"The absolute ideal is not given to man; we know that but too